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Improvements to Correlation Attacks Against Stream






Throughout the multi-thousand year history of cryptography, a huge number of encryption
methods have been developed to protect sensitive information. Many of these techniques do
not live up to modern standards of cryptographic security, but there are still a vast number
of options among those that do. In reality, the optimal choice of cipher depends heavily
on both the type of data being encrypted and the context in which it will be transferred
or used. For example: if the data is produced all at once or in large segments, a block-
based cipher such as AES may be appropriate. In a field such as real-time communication,
however, there is a need to perform high-speed, bit-by-bit encryption of messages with a
priori unknown length. These needs are addressed by a class of symmetric-key substitution
ciphers collectively known as stream ciphers.
The high-level operation of a stream cipher is quite simple: for each bit (binary value 0
or 1) of plaintext data fed into the system, a corresponding bit of encrypted ciphertext is
produced. To examine the details of this encryption, however, a formal notion of addition
for bits is required. If x and y are individual bits, we define the operation denoted by ⊕
(often called “exclusive or” or XOR) according to the following table:





Equivalently, x⊕y = 1 whenever x 6= y and x⊕y = 0 whenever x = y. XOR is equivalent to
addition modulo 2 and is thus both associative and commutative. Given a secret binary key
of the same length as our plaintext, we can now encrypt in a straightforward manner. To
do so, we XOR each bit of the plaintext data with the corresponding bit of the key. As an
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example, consider the following encryption operation performed on a short binary plaintext.
Note that we will represent binary sequences in our examples in the form b1b2b3 . . . bn, and
that performing an XOR operation on two-equal length sequences is equivalent to performing




Although the above sequences are presented in entirety, there is no dependence between the
encryption operations performed at each position. That is to say, the encryption could easily
have been performed separately on each pair of plaintext and key bits as they were produced.
Conveniently, the same key used for encryption can be used to decrypt the ciphertext
(this makes the cipher symmetric). Because x⊕ x = 0 for any value of x, the plaintext can
be recovered by adding the key to the ciphertext. That is,
ciphertext⊕ key = (plaintext⊕ key)⊕ key = plaintext⊕ 0 = plaintext.




While this method of combining keys with messages is straightforward, constructing
secure keys is a challenging problem. In an ideal world, we would always endeavor to perform
a one-time pad, in which a truly-random key of exactly the same length as the plaintext is
used. Indeed, Claude Shannon famously proved this type of cipher to be unbreakable in his
1949 paper [2]. In practice, the difficulty of creating and transmitting truly-random keys
is prohibitive – if a secure channel through which to communicate such keys existed, that
channel would presumably be used to send the messages themselves. Instead, stream ciphers
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attempt to approximate the security of a one-time pad by beginning with a relatively short
key and recursively generating a keystream of arbitrary length. Although the key is used to
initialize the system, the ciphertext is produced by XORing the plaintext and the keystream.
The initial key data in this context is known as a seed. In the stream ciphers of interest in
our research, the mechanism used to generate keystream bits based on the seed is known as
a linear feedback shift register.
1.2 Linear Feedback Shift Registers
Stream ciphers - at least those of interest in our research - make use of one or more linear
feedback shift registers (LFSRs) to recursively generate keys. An LFSR is a fixed-width
array of bits on which a shift operation can be performed. Each LFSR has an “input side”
and an “output side,” and performing a shift causes every bit in the LFSR to move one
position closer to the output side. As a result, the bit that was closest to the output side is
produced as output. In order to keep the LFSR from exhausting its initial supply of bits,
bits from predetermined positions in the array are XOR’d together prior to the shift taking
place. After each bit has been shifted, the bit resulting from the previous XOR operation
is inserted at the input side of the register. The positions involved in this operation are
referred to as the taps, and the recursion that they specify is referred to as the rule for the
register.
A visual example helps to clarify this definition. Since we will later distinguish between
the bits produced by different registers using subscripts, we will make the unconventional
choice of indexing the bits in our examples using superscripts. Hence, bt would describe the
bit b produced as output following the t-th shift of a register. Consider the example register
shown in figure 1. In order to perform the first shift, we compute b9 = b8⊕ b4⊕ b3⊕ b1. Each
bit is then moved one position to the left, causing b1 to be produced as output. Finally, b9
is inserted at the right-hand side of the register. More generally, the recursive rule for this
register is bn = bn−1⊕ bn−5⊕ bn−6⊕ bn−8. The specific bits stored within a register at a given
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Figure 1: An 8-bit LFSR before and after a shift operation is performed. The newly inserted
bit is b9 = b8 ⊕ b4 ⊕ b3 ⊕ b1.
time are referred to as its fill. The diagram in figure 2 shows the output of the same register
with initial fill (1, 1, 0, 1) over the course of three shifts.
Figure 2: A 4-bit register undergoing three shifts.
Since our goal is to generate arbitrarily long, pseudo-random keys using LFSRs, it is of
interest to maximize the period of the output they produce. Because an LFSR can only
take on a finite number of states and since each state is determined only by the previous
state, it should be apparent that the output of an LFSR must eventually become periodic.
By considering the number of possible fills for an LFSR of length k, we can see that the
maximum possible period of its output is 2k − 1. Note that an all-zero fill is excluded, since
any recursive rule given all-zero parameters will indefinitely produce zeros. Although we
omit the details, the period of a register’s output is largely determined by its recursive rule.
For each possible register length k, there is at least one recursive rule that will generate
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output with period 2k − 1 (assuming a non-zero initial fill is used). We will thus assume
that all registers employed in the cryptosystems we discuss have been selected in order to
generate maximal-period output.
2 Combiner Functions
While individual LFSRs may efficiently generate pseudorandom output streams, their linear-
ity makes cryptanalysis extremely simple. If an attacker possesses knowledge of a register’s
length, tap configuration, and a relatively small segment of corresponding output stream,
determining the initial fill of the register is reduced to an easily solvable system of linear
equations. Even combining the output of multiple, unrelated LFSRs with XOR does not add
substantial complexity to this problem. Hence, modern stream ciphers include additional
mechanisms to add nonlinear elements to the key generation process. Our research is focused
specifically on the use of nonlinear combiner functions to fulfill this need.
When making use of such a combiner, multiple LFSRs are configured to shift simultane-
ously, each outputting a single bit used in the argument of a Boolean function. We will define
a generator as a set of n LFSRs whose output at each shift is fed directly into a nonlinear
Boolean function f of n variables. At each time t, the first register is shifted to produce
bit xt1, the second register is shifted to produce bit x
t
2, and so on. The output of the entire
generator at time t is then computed as f(xt1, x
t
2, . . . , x
t
n). For brevity, we often denote the
vector (xt1, x
t
2, . . . , x
t
n) by x
t and denote the output of the generator as f(xt). More generally,
we use F2 to denote the field of integers modulo 2 (single bits), and Fn2 to denote n-length
vectors of elements from F2. When we are not concerned about the specific time at which
a vector xt or values xt1, x
t
2, . . . , x
t
n were produced, we will further simplify our notation to
x and x1, x2, . . . , xn. The diagram in figure 3 depicts a generator containing four registers
with outputs given as arguments to combiner function f . We will always assume that an
attacker has complete knowledge of a generator except for the initial fills of its registers.
5
Figure 3: A generator sourcing input from four LFSRs.
This both simplifies our analysis and is usually the case in practice. Hence, the key required
to perform encryption and decryption with a given generator is a list of initials fills and the
registers they correspond to. While systems of this form are nontrivial to cryptanalyze, later
discussion of correlation attacks against these generators will expose an even stricter set of
requirements on the function f .
3 Correlation Attacks
We now discuss the method of cryptanalysis introduced by T. Siegenthaler in his 1985
paper [3]. Although Siegenthaler described a ciphertext-only attack, we will reduce the
complexity of our development by assuming access to an excerpt of keystream produced
by the generator in question. If this were not the case, it would be necessary to test each
candidate keystream produced during the attack by XORing it with the ciphertext. Each
candidate plaintext produced by this process could then be somehow scored for similarity
to the expected language of the true plaintext. Siegenthaler also assumed that the tap
configuration of each register was unknown, an assumption we discard for simplicity and
practicality. Our goal is thus as follows: Given all details of a generator except for the fills
of its registers, and given an excerpt of keystream produced by the generator, we will seek
to recover the correct initial fills used to generate that keystream.
Suppose that the generator to be attacked contains n registers of lengths r1, r2, . . ., rn
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and an n-variable, nonlinear combiner function f . For convenience we will denote a set of
registers as an ordered list of integers corresponding to those registers’ indices within the
generator. To begin, we let R = (1, 2, . . . , n) describe the set of all registers in the given
generator. On top of knowledge of its registers, suppose also that we have N consecutive
bits of keystream produced by that generator using unknown initial fills. In order to test
hypotheses about those fills, we first create our own copy of the generator, referred to as
the test generator. Naively, we might then try every possible combination of register fills in
our test generator, each time generating a sequence of N output bits and testing them for
equality with the known keystream. Unfortunately, this entails
∏
(2ri − 1) possible tests.
Instead, we would prefer a means of attacking and recovering the initial fill of each register
independently, for a total of
∑
(2ri − 1) possible tests. This is not always possible, and in
general the goal of each attack is to recover the fills for some subset of the registers in R.
Throughout the paper, we will let A ⊂ R be the set of registers with known or previously
recovered fills and B ⊂ R be the set of registers targeted in the current attack. A broad
outline of the procedure for performing such an attack is as follows: find a function q that
depends only on the registers in A ∪ B (that is, on their corresponding variables) and for
which a non-trivial correlation (detailed below) exists between f and q. Although q only
depends on the registers in A ∪ B, we find it convenient to describe it as a function of all
n registers. Instead of f , we will use q as the combiner function for our test generator.
Figure 4 depicts a generator with four registers alongside a test generator depending on only
two of those registers. Suppose that xt = (xt1, x
t
2, . . . , x
t
n) is the unknown “correct” input
to f produced by the original generator at time t. Suppose also that yt = (yt1, y
t
2, . . . , y
t
n) is
the input to q produced by our test generator at the same time. The previously mentioned
correlation between f and q must be such that each possible pair of the form (f(xt), q(yt))
occurs with different probability depending on whether or not the correct initial fills have
been chosen for our test generator. We will formalize this procedure as a simple hypothesis
test, after which we will discuss how to find the best q functions for this purpose. The
7
Figure 4: A generator with combiner function f alongside a test generator with combiner
function q, which depends on only y2 and y4.
question of determining which groups of registers are vulnerable to attack is tied to the
choice of q function and will also be addressed at the end of this section.
3.1 Correlation Attack without Prior Knowledge
First, we consider attacks in which no prior knowledge about register fills is being leveraged.
That is, situations in which we are attacking a group of registers with unknown fills without
making use of previously recovered fills for other registers.
As before, we consider f and q as n-variable functions, with q depending only on the
registers in A ∪ B. Initially, we will assume that we have no prior knowledge and thus that
A = ∅ and that q depends only on the registers in B. Later, we will also allow q to depend on
previously-attacked registers of known fill. If Bn is the set of Boolean functions over Fn2 , then
f, q ∈ Bn. The two hypotheses under consideration are H0 and Ha. H0 is the hypothesis that,
at any time t, the inputs xt,yt ∈ Fn2 to f and q, respectively, are effectively independent.
Ha is the hypothesis that q(x
t) = q(yt) at every time t, meaning that the components of
xt and yt corresponding to the registers in A ∪B are equal. We refrain from asserting that
xt = yt, since we may not be generating output from the registers that q doesn’t depend
on. If we have chosen the wrong initial fills for the registers in A ∪ B, we would desire not
to reject H0. If we have chosen the correct fills, we would desire to reject H0 in favor of Ha.
This necessitates the development of a statistic that adequately distinguishes between the
two hypotheses.
8
Frequently, we find it useful to perform counting operations on the truth tables of com-
biner functions. For this we reserve the notation C(. . .), where the argument is an indicator
of the quantity being counted. In the interest of concise formulas, we will often represent
these quantities with notation like C(g = i) instead of C(x ∈ Fn2 : g(x) = i). In that vein, for
any function g ∈ Bn and any bit i ∈ F2, we define C(g = i) to be the number of arguments
x ∈ Fn2 for which g(x) = i. Equivalently,




If h is another function in Bn, we define C(g = i, h = j) to be the number of distinct
arguments x ∈ Fn2 for which g(x) = i and h(x) = j. A crucial point here is that C(g =
i, h = j) counts the number of times where g and h take the specified values given the same
argument. Equivalently,
C(g = i, h = j) =
∑
x∈Fn2
(g(x)⊕ i⊕ 1)(h(x)⊕ j ⊕ 1).
Under H0, where x and y are assumed to be independent and uniformly chosen from Fn2 ,
we have
P (f(x) = i) =
C(f = i)
2n





P (f(x) = i ∩ q(y) = j) = P (f(x) = i)P (q(y) = j) = C(f = i)C(q = j)
22n
.
Under Ha, where it is assumed that the components of x and y corresponding to A∪B are
equal, we have
P (f(x) = i ∩ q(y) = j) = C(f = i, q = j)
2n
.
For convenience, we use pij(H0) and pij(Ha) to indicate the probability P (f(x) = i∩q(y) = j)
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under the specified hypothesis. That is,
pij(H0) =




C(f = i, q = j)
2n
(2)
Next, we define the probability perturbation θ by
θ = p11(Ha)− p11(H0).
Using this definition and the basic concepts of probability, we can derive that
p00(Ha) = p00(H0) + θ, p01(Ha) = p01(H0)− θ,
p10(Ha) = p10(H0)− θ, p11(Ha) = p11(H0) + θ.
We often find it convenient and intuitive to display these probabilities in tables like those









0 p00(H0) + θ p01(H0)− θ
1 p10(H0)− θ p11(H0) + θ
Figure 5: The probability distributions for pairs of the form (f(x), q(y)) under H0 and Ha.
Note that θ = p11(Ha)− p11(H0).
between if and only if θ 6= 0, and that the statistical power of an attack will increase with
|θ|.
Let us consider an example in which f(x1, x2, x3, x4) = x1 +x2 +x3x4, the registers under
attack are specified by B = (1, 2), and q(x1, x2, x3, x4) = x1 +x2. The truth tables for f and
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q are shown below:
x1 x2 x3 x4 f(x) q(x)
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 1
1 0 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 0
Since C(f = 1) = C(f = 0) = 23 and C(q = 1) = C(q = 0) = 23, equation 1 yields the
probabilities (all 1
4
) in the H0 table shown below. Using equation 2, we can compute the
corresponding values in the Ha table. Since p11(Ha) =
3
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3.2 Correlation Attack with Prior Knowledge
Suppose that we are seeking to recover the initial fills for the registers in B ⊂ R and that
we have previously recovered the initial fills in another subset A ⊂ R. Although A and
B are conceptually sets of registers, we again find it notationally useful to treat them as
ordered lists of register indices. Consider any group of k registers S ⊂ R – we denote S by
S = (i1, i2, . . . ik), where the ij are integers corresponding to the desired registers (hence,
0 < i1 < i2 < . . . < ik ≤ n). Given a vector x ∈ Fn2 , we will often find it convenient to put
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constraints on the components of x corresponding to some subset of the registers. We use
x|S to denote the k-length vector (xi1 , xi2 , . . . , xik) of components from x corresponding to
the registers in S. We refer to the vector x|S as the restriction of x to S. If s ∈ Fk2 is a
vector of fixed values, we will write x|S = s to imply xi1 = s1, xi2 = s2, . . . xik = sk.
We now consider a function q ∈ Bn depending only on the registers in A ∪ B. Because
the input yt to q at time t is partially determined by the “known” registers in A, our null
hypothesis H0 can no longer assume that the “correct” inputs x
t are completely independent
from yt. Instead, we must assume that the components of x and y corresponding to the
registers inA are equal (i.e. that x|A = y|A), and that all other components are independent.
This affects the probability pij(H0), which we now adjust accordingly. We define the tuple
count C(g = i | S = s) to be a count of the number of arguments x ∈ Fn2 for which x|S = s
and g(x) = i. In order to compute pij(H0) while taking the equal components of x and y into
account, we sum the conditional probabilities that f(x) = q(y) given that x|A = y|A = a









C(f = i | A = a)
2n−|A|
)(











C(f = i | A = a)C(q = j | A = a)
(3)
Note that if A = ∅, this expression reduces to the probability given in equation 1. The tables
shown in figure 5 still apply in this case, with the caveat that equation 3 must be used to
compute pij(H0).
Continuing our above example with f(x) = x1⊕x2⊕x3x4, we now assume that the fills of
registers 1 and 2 have been successfully recovered, and that our next goal is to attack register
3. In this case, A = (1, 2) and B = (3). In order to leverage the known information about
registers 1 and 2, we would like to choose a q function that depends exactly on registers 1,
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2, and 3. Although conventional practice is to use the linear combination of outputs from
those registers, we will choose q(x) = 1⊕ x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x1x3 ⊕ x2x3 to better illustrate the
need for equation 3. The truth tables of f and this new q are shown below, alongside the
corresponding probability tables:
x1 x2 x3 x4 f(x) q(x)
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 1 0
0 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 1 0 1
1 1 1 0 0 0











Note that θ = −1/16 and that the probabilities in the H0 table differ from those that would
have been produced by equation 1. We are not aware of any prior authors explicitly observing
or addressing the differences that occur in this case.
3.3 Test Statistic
Although there are a number of valid statistics for distinguishing H0 from Ha, we will focus
on the classical statistic presented by Siegenthaler [3]. When generalized to support multi-
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register attacks, that statistic is defined to be




where f(xt) is the given keystream output at time t and q(yt) is the output from the test
generator at time t.
Consider the generic hypothesis H ∈ {H0, Ha} and let pf 6=q(H) = p01(H) + p10(H). Note
that
pf 6=q(Ha) = p01(Ha) + p10(Ha) = p01(H0) + p10(H0)− 2θ = pf 6=q(H0)− 2θ.
If we define Y =
∑N
t=1 f(x
t) ⊕ q(yt), then Y is a binomial random variable with N trials
and probability of success pf 6=q(H). Hence,
E(Y ) = Npf 6=q(H),
V (Y ) = Npf 6=q(H)(1− pf 6=q(H)).
Denoting E(γ | H) by µ(H) and V (γ | H) by σ2(H), we thus have
µ(H0) = N − 2Npf 6=q(H0),
σ2(H0) = 4Npf 6=q(H0)(1− pf 6=q(H0)).
and
µ(Ha) = N − 2Npf 6=q(Ha)
= N − 2Npf 6=q(H0) + 4Nθ,
σ2(Ha) = 4Npf 6=q(Ha)(1− pf 6=q(Ha))
= 4N(pf 6=q(H0)− 2θ)(1− pf 6=q(H0) + 2θ).
Because Y is binomial andN is often large, we approximate γ as a normal random variable. It
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should be clear that µ(H0) = µ(Ha) and σ
2(H0) = σ
2(Ha) when θ = 0, making it impossible
to distinguish between the two distributions.
As is generally the case with hypothesis testing, we would like to either be aware of the
type I error (α) and type II error (β) for a fixed number of keystream bits N , or to determine
N based on values of α and β. If we consider a rejection region for H0 of the form γ ≥ γ∗
for θ > 0 and γ ≤ γ∗ for θ < 0, then















−1(1− α) + µ(H0) (6)
and
γ∗ = − sgn(θ)
√
σ2(Ha)Φ
−1(1− β) + µ(Ha), (7)





pf 6=q(Ha)(1− pf 6=q(Ha)) + Φ−1(1− α)
√





This is the number of keystream bits required to achieve desired α and β errors.
We now return to our previous example where f(x) = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3x4. During our first
attack on registers 1 and 2 in which we chose q(x) = x1 ⊕ x2, for which pf 6=q(H0) = 1/2,
pf 6=q(Ha) = 1/4, and θ = 1/8. If we fix α = 2
−20 and β = 2−20, we can use equation 8 to
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Hence, to perform the attack while achieving our desired levels of α and β, we need at least
316 bits of known keystream data.
We can perform the same calculations for our extended example in which the now-
recovered fills of registers 1 and 2 are used to attack register 3. With our choice of q(x) =
1⊕ x1⊕ x2⊕ x3⊕ x1x3⊕ x2x3, we can compute pf 6=q(H0) = 5/8 and pf 6=q(Ha) = 3/4 . With

























In this case, 1221 bits of keystream would be required to perform the desired attack. It should
not be surprising that this number is‘’ larger than in the first case, since θ is significantly
smaller.
4 Correlation-Immune Functions
Thus far, we have not provided a method for determining which sets of registers A and
B will admit q functions that allow meaningful correlation attacks. An extremely useful
concept in making this determination is that of correlation immunity, a property first defined
by Siegenthaler in 1984 [4]. Consider again a function f ∈ Bn and the set of registers
R = (1, 2, . . . , n). f is said to be correlation immune of order k if for every subset S ⊂ R of
16
Figure 6: Distributions of γ under H0 (red) and Ha (blue) for f(x) = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3x4 and
q(x) = x1 ⊕ x2 with N = 50 bits. The red shaded area indicates α = 2−4 and the blue
shaded area is the corresponding power, 1− β ≈ 0.99.
k registers and an unknown value x ∈ Fn2 , the probability that x|S = s given a value f(x)
is equal for all choices of s ∈ Fk2. That is, the value of f(x) is statistically independent of
the value of x|S. For example, if f is correlation immune of order 3 and S = (1, 3, 4) then
there must be equally many values of x ∈ Fn2 for which x|S = (0, 1, 0) and f(x) = 1 as for
which x|S = (1, 1, 0) and f(x) = 1.
To see why this property prevents correlation attacks, consider a function f ∈ Bn, with f
being correlation immune of order k. Suppose also that q depends on the k or fewer variables
in some S ⊂ R and that q(x) = j exactly when x|S is one of s1, s2, . . . , sm ∈ F|S|2 . For every
x ∈ Fn2 , this means that








P (f(x) = i)P (x|S = si)
= P (f(x) = i)P (q(x) = j)
= pij(H0).
Hence, a correlation attack against f and using q will not succeed.
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4.1 The Walsh Transform
Luckily, a more practical method exists for determining the correlation immunity of a func-
tion f . First, note that we consider the dot product of two vectors a, b ∈ Fn2 to be defined





In effect, the term f(x) ⊕ ω · x measures how similar f is to the linear combination of
variables specified by ω · x. Exponentiating with a base of −1 maps values of 0 and 1 to
values of 1 and −1, respectively. Hence, the transform can be equivalently defined as
W (f)(ω) = C(f = ω · x)− C(f 6= ω · x),
where C(f = ω · x) is a count of how many distinct values x ∈ Fn2 make f(x) equal to the
linear function ω · x and C(f 6= ω · x) is its complement
18
Consider the Walsh transform of f(x1, x2, x3, x4) = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3x4 depicted below:
ω C(f = ω · x) C(f 6= ω · x) W (f)(ω)
0000 8 8 0
0001 8 8 0
0010 8 8 0
0100 8 8 0
1000 8 8 0
0011 8 8 0
0101 8 8 0
0110 8 8 0
1010 8 8 0
1100 12 4 8
0111 8 8 0
1011 8 8 0
1101 12 4 8
1110 12 4 8
1111 4 12 −8
Note that we have ordered the values of ω by their Hamming weight, or the number of 1s in
each vector. From a theorem presented by Xiao and Massey [5], we have the important result
that a function g ∈ Bn is correlation immune of order k if and only if its Walsh transform is
0 for all values of ω ∈ Fn2 with Hamming weight of k or less. Hence, the function f whose
Walsh transform is shown above is correlation immune of order 1. In practical terms, this
means that no correlation attack is feasible against two-or-fewer registers from a generator
with combiner f .
4.2 Prior Results for Choosing q
While the Walsh transform gives us useful information about which groups of registers can
be successfully attacked, we still lack a means of determining which combiner q for our test
generator will admit the largest value of θ. As mentioned previously, the convention is to
always choose a linear function of the variables/registers in question. This intuition is not
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entirely baseless, as demonstrated by Canteaut and Trabbia in their 2000 paper [1]. The
paper first defines a notion of t-resilience: A function f ∈ Bn is said to be t-resilient if it
is correlation immune of order t and if C(f = 1) = C(f = 0). Canteaut proves that, given
a generator with a t-resilient combiner f , the optimal choice of combiner q to use during a
correlation attack on a group B = (i1, i2, . . . , it, it+1) of t + 1 registers is the affine function
q(x) = xi1 ⊕ xi2 ⊕ . . .⊕ xit+1 ⊕ c. The value of the constant term c is determined as follows:
Let 1B be the bit vector in Fn2 for which the i-th component is 1 if and only if i ∈ B. Then
c = 0 if W (f)(1B) > 0 and c = 1 otherwise.
Since our example combiner f(x) = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3x4 is both balanced and correlation
immune of order 2, it is also 2-resilient. Hence, we are guaranteed that the optimal choice
of q for a correlation attack on the registers in B = (1, 2) is q(x) = x1⊕ x2. Whether or not
a linear q function is always optimal for a group of more than t + 1 registers appears to be
an open question. Although it does not answer this question universally, our work provides
a systematic method of determining the optimal q function to use in any stage of an attack.
We also introduce a novel test method that in certain cases allows for an attack with 100%
statistical power.
5 Our Results
5.1 A Method for an Optimal Choice of q
Our procedure for choosing an optimal q function requires carefully expanding the formula
for θ. To do so, we first partition the set R of all registers into three disjoint subsets. As
before, let A be the set of registers with previously recovered fill and let B be the set of
registers targeted in the current attack. We also let C be the set of registers not present in
A ∪ B. We use f(a, b, c) to indicate the value f(x) where x|A = a, x|B = b, and x|C = c.
q(a, b, c) will have similar meaning. Since q only depends on the registers in A∪B, however,
it must be the case that for a fixed a and b, q(a, b, c) = q(a, b,d) for all c,d ∈ F|C|2 . We
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will thus use the notation q(a, b) to denote any and all of these values. To de-clutter our





s wherever the usage of s
makes its parent set clear. We now proceed to derive our expansion of θ.
Using the fact that
p11(Ha) =












































































we can derive that















































F (a, b)q(a, b),
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where










Because we know that the coefficient of each q(a, b) term is F (a, b), we can choose each value
of q(a, b) (that is, the values of q(x) for all x where x|A = a and x|B = b) to maximize the
overall expression. Hence, we let q(a, b) = 1 if F (a, b) > 0 and let q(a, b) = 0 if F (a, b) < 0.
The value of q(a, b) can be chosen arbitrarily if F (a, b) = 0, although we generally prefer to
make q a linear function whenever possible.
Using this procedure, it should be possible to confirm the optimal choices of q for our
earlier examples with f(x) = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3x4. With respect to the initial attack on registers
1 and 2, we have A = ∅, B = (1, 2), and C = (3, 4). The following table shows each value of
F (a, b) for this scenario and our corresponding choices for q(a, b):
a b F (a, b) q(a, b)
∅ (0, 0) −4 0
∅ (0, 1) 4 1
∅ (1, 0) 4 1
∅ (1, 1) −4 0
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In other words, the truth table for q must be
x1 x2 x3 x4 f(x) q(x)
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 1
1 0 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 0
which corresponds to the expected (via Canteaut’s result) linear function q(x) = x1 ⊕ x2
with θ = 1/8. If we perform the same procedure when A = (1, 2), B = (3), and C = (4), we
derive the following values of F :
a b F (a, b) q(a, b)
(0, 0) (0) −1 0
(0, 0) (1) 1 1
(0, 1) (0) 1 1
(0, 1) (1) −1 0
(1, 0) (0) 1 1
(1, 0) (1) −1 0
(1, 1) (0) −1 0
(1, 1) (1) 1 1
Although we omit the full 4-variable truth table of q, the resulting function is q(x) =
x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3 with θ = 1/8.
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5.2 The Impossible Pairs Test
For the same combiner f(x) = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3x4, recall our previous example attack in which
A = (1, 2), B = (3), and q(x) = 1⊕x1⊕x2⊕x3⊕x1x3⊕x2x3. The probability tables under











Although a classical correlation attack is possible in this case, the fact that (f(x), q(y)) =
(0, 0) occurs with probability 0 under Ha suggests a different type of test. In general, we
refer to a pair of bits (b1, b2) for which pb1b2(H0) 6= 0 and pb1b2(Ha) = 0 as an impossible pair
and, assuming such a pair can be found, we perform an impossible pair test.
We will first focus on the details of exploiting an impossible pair (b1, b2) given combiners
f, q ∈ Bn that produce it. Suppose we are given sets of registers A,B ⊂ R with their usual
meanings and N bits of keystream, denoted as the sequence {st} = s1, s2, . . . , sN (recall that
we use a superscript to indicate the time/index of each output). For each combination of
initial fills assigned to the registers in B, we produce an equal length sequence {pt} from our
test generator. If at any time i between 0 and N it is the case that (si, pi) = (b1, b2), then we
reject the fills under consideration. We can have complete confidence in this decision, since
such a pair will never be produced if the correct fills have been chosen. Thus, this resulting
test has the rare advantage of 100% statistical power.
Although the type II error for this test is 0, we may still wish to fix one of α or N and to
compute the other. Under H0, the impossible pair (b1, b2) occurs with probability pb1b2(H0).





(f(xt), q(yt)) 6= (b1, b2) for any t ≤ N
)












Continuing the preceding example, performing an impossible pair test for (1, 1) while






bits of keystream data. Using the same q function and fixing N = 215 and α = 2−20, the
attack performed with Siegenthaler’s statistic has a type II error of β ≈ 0.186 ≈ 2−2.43
(computed using equations 5 and 6). Even when using the known-optimal q function q(x) =
x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3 with the same N and α, the standard attack yields β ≈ 0.0015 ≈ 2−9.37. This
illustrates the fact that impossible pairs attacks are worth considering whenever they are
available.
5.3 Finding Impossible Pairs
Once again, let f ∈ Bn be a combiner that depends on all registers/variables in R. The
following definitions and results provide a means of determining if and when a given set of
registers will be susceptible to an impossible pairs attack.
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Definition 1. We say the set S ⊂ R with |S| = k has the all-cases property if for every
s ∈ Fk2, both C(f = 0 | S = s) > 0 and C(f = 1 | S = s) > 0.
If f(x) = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3x4, for example, and S = (1, 2), we have the following table of tuple
counts:
s C(f = 0 | S = s) C(f = 1 | S = s)
(0, 0) 3 1
(0, 1) 1 3
(1, 0) 3 1
(1, 1) 1 3
Hence, S has the all cases property. Note that R itself never has the all-cases property, since
for any x ∈ Fn2 , either f(x|R) = f(x) = 0 or f(x|R) = f(x) = 1, but not both.
Proposition 1. If S ⊂ R has the all-cases property, then every subset of S also has the
all-cases property.
Proof. Let S = (i1, i2, . . . , ik) have the all-cases property. Since any subset of S can be
constructed by removing a finite number of elements from S, we will simply prove that if
|S| = k > 1, any subset of S with k − 1 elements also has the all-cases property. The more
general result follows from induction.
Let S ′ ⊂ S be such that |S ′| = k − 1, and let ij be the single remaining element
in S − S ′. For any b = (b1, b2, . . . , bk−1) ∈ Fk−12 , we can define a0,a1 ∈ Fk2 by a0 =
(b1, b2, . . . , bj−1, 0, bj, bj+1, . . . , bk−1) and a1 = (b1, b2, . . . , bj−1, 1, bj, bj+1, . . . , bk−1). Since both
a0|S ′ = b and a1|S ′ = b, we see that
C(f = 0 | S ′ = b) = C(f = 0 | S = a0) + C(f = 0 | S = a1) > 0,
and
C(f = 1 | S ′ = b) = C(f = 1 | S = a0) + C(f = 1 | S = a1) > 0.
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Definition 2. We say S ⊂ R has the all-cases property of order k if every subset S ′ ⊂ S
with |S ′| = k possesses the all-cases property. We say f itself possesses the all-cases property
of order k if R does.
Note that by the previous proposition, if S ⊂ R has the all-cases property of order k
then it also has the all-cases property of order j wherever 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
Consider a function q ∈ Bn for use in our test generator. If f and q have impossible pair
(b1, b2) for some b1, b2 ∈ F2, then we call q a pair-prevention function. We also refer to the
set of registers on which q depends (always A ∪B in our attacks) as depend(q).
Lemma 1. Let S ⊂ R. If S possesses the all-cases property, then any pair-prevention
function q with depend(q) ⊂ S must be constant.
Proof. Let S ⊂ R be such that S possess the all-cases property. Suppose that q is a pair-
prevention function depending only on the variables in S and let (b1, b2) be the corresponding
impossible pair.
Let a ∈ Fn2 , and let b = a|S. Since q depends only on the variables in S, it must be
that for any other a′ ∈ Fn2 with a′|S = b we have q(a) = q(a′). By the all-cases property,
we know C(f = b1 | S = b) > 0, implying that there is an a′ ∈ Fn2 with a′|S = b such that
f(a′) = b1. Since q prevents (b1, b2), we must have q(a
′) = b2 ⊕ 1 and thus q(a) = b2 ⊕ 1.
Since q takes the value b2 ⊕ 1 for every a ∈ Fn2 , it must be constant.
Lemma 2. If S ⊂ R does not possess the all-cases property, then there is a nonconstant
pair-prevention function q ∈ Bn with depend(q) ⊂ S.
Proof. Let S ⊂ R be a set without the all-cases property. Then there must exist p ∈ F2 and
b ∈ F|S|2 such that C(f = p | S = b) = 0. Since f is nonconstant and depends on all of its
variables, there must also be values b′ ∈ F|S|2 for which C(f = p | S = b′) > 0.
Let a ∈ Fn2 . If C(f = p | S = a|S) = 0, define q(a) = 0. Otherwise, define q(a) = 1.
By the preceding logic regarding f , q must be nonconstant. Since the value of q(a) depends
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only on the value of a|S, we must have depend(q) ⊂ S. Additionally the pair (p, 0) never
occurs, since f(a) = p implies that C(f = p | S = a|S) > 0 which implies that q(a) = 1.
The construction of q used in this proof is made systematic in the following section. Com-
bining the two lemmas, we have the following useful criterion for the existence of nonconstant
pair-prevention functions:
Theorem 1. Let S ⊂ R. A nonconstant pair-prevention function q ∈ Bn with depend(q) ⊂ S
exists if and only if S does not have the all-cases property.
5.4 The P -Transform
When attempting to find pair-prevention functions for a given Boolean function f , we care
only about the “presence” of any given tuple count – not its actual value. Although comput-
ing the exact tuple counts for a given subset of R gives us this information, we really only
care about the extrema - values for which either the f = 0 tuple count or the f = 1 tuple
count is 0. Since the specific values at which these tuple counts are 0 completely determine
the pair-prevention functions admitted, it would be ideal to both locate these values and
construct the truth tables of our desired functions in a single operation.
We introduce the following notation to assist with such an operation.
Definition 3. Given a ∈ Fk2, define v(a) = a120 + a221 + . . . + ak2k−1 (in Z). We refer to
v(a) as the integer value of a.
Definition 4. Given a ∈ Fk2, define δ(a) to be the vector of length 2k for which δ(a)i = 1
when i = v(a) + 1 and δ(a)i = 0 otherwise.
Definition 5. Given S ⊂ R, we define m(S) to be a vector of length |R| = n such that
m(S)i = 1 when i ∈ S and m(S)i = 0 otherwise. We refer to m(S) as the mask of S.
For example, if a = (0, 1, 1) we have v(a) = 1102 = 6 and δ(a) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0). Also,
if |R| = 5 and S = (1, 3), then m(S) = (1, 0, 1, 0, 0).
28
We now introduce an operation that, for a given set of variables S and a given value
p ∈ F2, computes a general form of the truth table for every pair-prevention function q
corresponding to impossible pairs of the form (p, b2) (for both b2 = 0 and b2 = 1) and
depending only on the variables in S. Note that ∨ corresponds to the Boolean “or” operation
defined by the following truth table:





Definition 6. Let p ∈ F2 and S ⊂ R. For x ∈ Fn2 , we define the case indicator function
Cf (S, p,x) as follows:
Cf (S, p,x) = 1⊕ [1⊕ p⊕ f(x)] [1⊕ f(x)⊕ f(xm(S))]
= [p⊕ f(x)] ∨ [f(x)⊕ f(xm(S))] ,
where xm(S) is the component-wise product of the vectors x and m(S).
The two equivalent definitions are provided for clarity – the first is written directly in terms
of field operations and the second is more concise and practical for implementation. This
function is equal to 1 exactly when any two of f(x), f(xs), and p differ.
Definition 7. Let p ∈ F2 and S ⊂ R. We define the P transform as follows:
Pf (S, p) =
∏
x∈Fn2
1⊕ Cf (S, p,x) δ(x|S),
where 1 is the length 2|S| vector with every component equal to 1.
For any b ∈ F|S|2 , Pf (S, p)v(b) = 0 exactly when there exists an a ∈ Fn2 such that a|S = b
and either f(a) 6= f(am(S)) or f(a) 6= p. Equivalently, Pf (S, p)v(b) = 1 exactly when the
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tuple count C(f = p ⊕ 1 | S = b) = 0. Furthermore, Pf (S, p) can be considered as the
truth table for a function q′ of the variables in S, defined by letting q′(y) = Pf (S, p)v(y)+1 for
each y ∈ F|S|2 . It can be then be extended to an equivalent n-variable function q by defining
q(x) = q′(x|S) for each x ∈ Fn2 . This function will prevent pairs of the form (p⊕ 1, 1). The
function q(x)⊕ 1 will similarly prevent pairs of the form (p⊕ 1, 0).
Remark 1. Although the Boolean operation “or” is a less trivial vector operation than mul-
tiplication, we can use it to create an equivalent definition of the P -transform that may be




Cf (S, p,x) δ(x|S)
Furthermore, the multiplication by δ(x|S) could potentially be described in terms of a binary
shift operation.
Note that every pair-prevention function q′ ∈ B|S| depending only on the variables in S
will have a truth table vector of the following form: Pf (S, p) with any of its 1 values (but
not all) optionally replaced by 0, and with a constant function 1 optionally added to it. The
P -transform values for f(x) = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3x4 are depicted in Tables 1 and 2.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have reviewed the existing knowledge surrounding correlation attacks on
LFSR-based stream ciphers with nonlinear combiners. Although these details are well es-
tablished, we are not aware of other authors who explicitly detail the probabilities involved
in each possible case. Along with these results, we have introduced a concrete method for
deriving the optimal q function to use in any classical correlation attack. In addition to this,
we have introduced a novel attack procedure that exploits the existence of “impossible pairs”
for f and q functions that admit them. Finally, we have developed the theory necessary to
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p = 0:












(1, 2, 3) 10000010 1⊕ x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x1x3 ⊕ x2x3
(1, 2, 4) 10000010 1⊕ x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x4 ⊕ x1x4 ⊕ x2x4
(1, 3, 4) 00000000
(2, 3, 4) 00000000
(1, 2, 3, 4) 1110000100011110 1⊕ x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3x4
Table 1: The vectors produced by the P -transform with f(x) = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3x4 and p = 0.
When the resulting vector is non-constant, the corresponding q function is included.
p = 1:












(1, 2, 3) 00101000 x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x1x3 ⊕ x2x3
(1, 2, 4) 00101000 x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x1x4 ⊕ x2x4
(1, 3, 4) 00000000
(2, 3, 4) 00000000
(1, 2, 3, 4) 0001111011100001 x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3x4
Table 2: The vectors produced by the P -transform with f(x) = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3x4 and p = 1.
When the resulting vector is non-constant, the corresponding q function is included.
determine exactly when it will be possible to exploit such pairs. This included the introduc-
tion of the P -transform in order to explicitly construct pair-preventing q functions for all
susceptible subsets of the registers. Future work may focus on relating the all-cases property
to other, better known algebraic properties of Boolean functions, and on the potential use
of multiple, independent pair-prevention functions within a single attack.
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